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What distinguishes our type of society from others is what 
are called the Civil Liberties we enjoy, the righs which a citizen 
may call his own: individual rights which do not depend upon 
the bounty of the State and indeed, in certain cases, may well 
exist to what, at the particular moment, is believed to be the 
general detriment of the State. This, at least, is the theory. 
Most of us will have read of the disappearance, after secret trial 
and secret evidence, of Boris Pasternak’s co-worker and friend. 
That sort of thing, we say, could not happen here. Foremost of 
our distinguishing liberties is the freedom to think what we
f»lease. Further, we may say what we think within certain fair- y clearly defined limits. Again, we may do what we please, 
again within clearly defined limits.
These are the basic civil liberties: the freedoms which we 
enjoy and which the whole democratic process is designed to 
secure. This freedom cannot be absolute. Absolute freedom, 
as advocated by the Anarchists, rests upon the notion of man as 
a noble savage, a notion surely forever destroyed by the history 
of the twentieth century, if not even before then. In so far as 
the interests of all may bie ascertained we call them the interests 
of Society. These interests of Society must be balanced against 
the interests of any individual in order to allow the maximum 
practical freedom for each. We are justly proud of the balance 
which we have achieved within our democratic communities.
A proper balance is a relative matter, however, and yester­
day’s balance may not suit today’s society. If democratic society 
is to survive as the best in all probable worlds we must constantly 
be on guard that the balance remains properly adjusted.
What has the law of evidence to do with freedom? I have 
defined civil liberty in terms of the citizens right to think, talk 
and act. We lawyers, by a perfectly natural transposition, are 
accustomed to use the word to designate those legal devices by 
which these great freedoms are secured. The law of evidence 
is not the least significant of these devices.
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Before passing to the law of evidence, however, it is neces­
sary, however briefly, to set our topic in relation to the new 
Canadian Bill of Rights. (1> I have defined civil liberty in very 
general terms as the citizen’s right to think, talk and act. The 
Bill of Rights does exactly the same thing defining the rights in 
general, or political terms, in Section I, where certain human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, the right of the individual to 
life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property, 
the right to equality before the law, freedom of religion, freedom 
of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of the press are 
guaranteed.
I have referred to the legal devices by which these general 
freedoms are secured, usually called by lawyers, civil liberties. 
Section 2 of the Bill of Rights refers to certain legal devices by 
which the rights which are set out in section I may actually be 
secured. Matters of evidence are dealt with directly in some 
only of the clauses of Section 2. Section 2 (f) refers to the pre­
sumption of innocence. Section 2 (d) refers to the compella­
bility of a person to give evidence if he is denied counsel, pro­
tection against self-crimination or other constitutional safeguards. 
Section 2 (e) refers to the right to a fair hearing.
My thesis is that the law of Evidence may be involved in 
civil liberties in one of two ways.
Firstly, there are certain evidentiary notions which can be 
related only to the protection of civil liberties. Secondly, there 
is a possibility that the law of evidence may be used as an in­
direct protection for civil liberties. I shall deal firstly with the 
first sub-division, devices related only to the protection of civil 
liberties.
The first of these devices is the presumption of innocence. 
This presumption, so called, has two aspects: firstly, as a general 
policy in the light of which all the rules relating to trials must 
be viewed: secondly, as the device by which the primary and 
secondary burdens of proof are generally to be allocated to the 
prosecution where a person is charged with having transgressed 
the limits of his freedom. It is up to the prosecution to introduce 
evidence upon which a jury could convict, i.e., to make out a 
prima facie case. In the event that the particular Judge or jury 
is left with a reasonable doubt as to guilt, the accused may be 
acquitted. It is an interesting subject for speculation whether 
the Courts will give any effect to the Bill of Rights in this regard. 
If any meaning is given to Section 2 (f), it would seem that a 
number of existing evidence rules have been altered. Those 
that come immediately to mind are the presumptions that arise
1. (1960) 8-9 Eliz. II  c. 44 Can.
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from mere possession of narcotics and smuggled goods. It is my 
own guess that Canadian judges will not be prepared to treat 
the Bill as affecting any existing trial procedures, i.e., they will 
treat it as merely declaratory of the existing law.
The other device with which I propose to deal is the right 
set out in the Bill of Rights, Section 2 (cl) not to be compelled to 
give evidence if a person is denied counsel, protection against 
self-crimination or other constitutional safeguards.
(a) “if he is denied counsel”. The right of an accused 
person to retain counsel is, of course, well established in the 
orthodox courts. The provision was, no doubt, aimed at pre­
venting administrative tribunals and other quasi-courts from im­
porting a new practice which would preclude the appearance of 
counsel on behalf of interested parties. Two things are to be 
noted about this liberty to have counseL First, there may be 
economic denial of counsel even though there is political free­
dom. Secondly, the provision as it stands gives the right of 
counsel to any person who is compelled to give evidence, i.e., 
any witness. If this plain meaning is accepted by the courts, 
it means a substantial change in court procedure and a consider­
able financial benefit to the legal profession. It would, how­
ever, be regarded as a backward step by many of us to turn our 
courts into the sort of circus well exemplified by the American 
Congressional Committees. On the other hand, it might well be 
a forward step in other tribunals which have tended to retreat 
every witness as a quasi or potential accused.
(b) “if he is denied protection against self-crimination’’
The common law privilege against self incrimination arose 
in England in the mid-seventeenth century in consequence of the 
religious persecution then rampant. Th Star Chamber, with its 
ex-officio oath, approximated the Spanish inquisition and aroused 
a revulsion from the process whereby a man could be interro­
gated ruthlessly as to his acts and beliefs and then condemned 
on what had been extracted from him.
As Dr. Glanville Williams has pointed out, the privilege in 
England really consists of two separate privileges:
(1) the right of an accused person to remain silent and
not to be questioned
(2) the right of any witness, other than the person on
trial, to refuse to answer questions, the answers to 
which might incriminate him.
These two elements will be considered separately.
The right of an accused person to be free from questioning 
at trial is, of course, expressly recognized by the Canada Evi-
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dence Act, s. 4 (2) which provides that an accused person may, 
but cannot be compelled to, go into the witness box.
Such is the case under our own Evidence Act, s. 5 (3) which 
provides that on a trial for violation of a provincial statute, the 
accused shall not be compelled to testify.
As Professor Maguire of Harvard has pointed out in his re­
cent book “Evidence of Guilt" (4) this privilege harmonizes with 
the firm precept of our legal system that innocence rather than 
guilt of an accused person shall be assumed when his criminal 
trial begins. He advances the proposition that the privilege is 
supportable only because it brings substantial benefit to the 
community by aiding the innocent, by tending to convict the 
guilty or at least on the whole not unauly impeding conviction, 
and by advancing good public policy in other ways. As he 
points out, supporters of tne privilege assert that to allow inter­
rogation, even in court alone, might lead to an undue reliance 
by the prosecution upon the fruits of such interrogation — a 
skilful and unscrupulous prosecutor might trick an innocent 
person into conviction: a lazy police investigation might let a 
man guilty but quick-witted, steer his way to acquittal.
In terms of public policy. Professor Maguire points out 
that it is highly important to have wide respect for the adminis­
tration of justice — this privilege has contributed to such respect 
and as Maguire emphasizes:
“Accustomed personal safeguards, fixed in men’s minds
by usage of decades and centuries, are not lightly to
be destroyed”
What is the other side of the coin? Are there any arguments 
against the continuation of this freedom not to incriminate your­
self? Why do we deprive ourselves in many cases of the evi­
dence of the main suspect, the prson most likly to know the 
truth? Under our present law, a man charged with the murder 
of his wife and proved to have been the only other person in the 
house with her when she died may not be forced to go into the 
witness-box, nor may the judge or prosecutor comment on his 
failure to do so.
Are we too defence-minded? In a recent report, (5) the lone 
dissenting member of the British section of the International 
Commission of Jurists is of opinion that the British are. He pro­
2. R.S.C. 1952, c. 307, s. 4.
3. R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 74, s. 5.
4. Evidence of Guilt by John MacArthur Maguire; Little, Brown 
& Co. (1959) Chapter 2.
5. Not yet available.
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poses that, subject to certain conditions, an accused person 
should be liable to be forced into the witness-box. He would 
not lie forced to answer the questions put to him but his failure 
to answer would certainlv count against him. It should be noted 
that under existing English law a judge may comment on the 
failure of the second to give evidence.
Defence lawyers will reply that under existing Canadian 
law an accused person who was forced into the witness-box 
would be treated as any other witness and if he had a criminal 
record would have it immediately exposed to the jury.
Can these objections be met?
The first objection that interrogation might be so unfair 
as to lead to the conviction of the innocent clearly suggests that 
our courts are so badly conducted that a witness may be so 
bullied and badgered that he is incapable of conveying a true 
impression. If this is so, the whole machinery of criminal justice 
is sadly in need of over-haul. It is one of the duties of a judge 
to protect all witnesses from unfair treatment. There are few 
complaints about the superior Court judges in this regard; it 
may be that some of our magistrates need to be reminded of this 
duty.
The second objection that the accused who is forced into 
the witness-box will automatically be forced to disclose his 
criminal record could easily be met by repealing this harsh and 
unfair rule. To use the words of a seventeenth century English 
judge, a man should not be tried on his whole life but on the 
facts of the crime of which he stands accused. In England, an 
accused person who chooses to go into the witness-box is given 
special protection against having a criminal record disclosed.
It is clearly unjust to convict the innocent and every effort 
must be made to avoid such a judicial error. It is, however, 
also unjust to acquit the guilty. It would seem reasonable that 
criminal courts should attempt to convict all the guilty and 
acquit the innocent.
That the present rule of privilege is questionable in its effect 
is well illustrated by a recent Ontario case. (6)
Two young men were charged with the rape of a young 
girl. The evidence for the prosecution was that the girl was 
walking with another girl when the pair were accosted by some 
youths in an automobile. The youths dragged one of the girls 
into the car and drove off. Her companion noted the licence 
number and ran home and told her parents, who informed the 
police. The girl who had been abducted later returned to her
6. [1959] O.W.N. 286 (C.A.).
12 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL
home claiming that she had been raped by the youths in the car. 
The police by this time had traced the car and taken two youths 
into custody. There was blood and semen on their clothes and 
on the car seat. At an identification parade arranged by the 
police, the girl identified one youth by nis appearance, but had 
difficulty identifying the second. At the trial, both were con­
victed but, on appeal, the second was acquitted. At no time was 
this second youth put in the witness-box and asked to account 
for himself on the night in question! At no stage of his trial 
was he asked how the blood and semen got on his clothes! Yet 
these are the first questions a reasonable person would ask when 
determining his guilt or innocence.
This is not to suggest that the youth was guilty. However, 
it is suggested that his guilt or innocence would only sensibly 
be determined by asking him these questions. As Maguire 
points out “Liberty never comes free of charge.”
Is the charge too steep here? Is the balance adjusted? Mr. 
John Foster, the dissenting member of the British Section of the 
International Commission of Jurists ejroressly, and Professor Ma­
guire impliedly propose that the privilege of an accused against 
self-crimination be abolished and that he be made a compellable 
witness subject to the requirement that the prosecutor make out 
a prima facie case before being given liberty to call him.
An alternative suggestion was made in 1940 by Dr. C. A. 
Wright. (7) The English rule was preferable to the Canadian 
in his opinion, in that under the present interpretation of the 
Canada Evidence Act s. 12, an accused in Canada is in fact dis­
couraged from giving evidence in that his record, if any, would 
automatically be thrown at him if he did. The present rule is 
that an accused need not go into the witness-box: if he does he 
is open to cross-examination on his record: if he decides to re­
main silent, no comment may be made on his decision by Judge 
or prosecutor. Dean Wright suggests that it might be more in 
the interests of justice to protect an accused from automatic 
cross-examination on his record and to permit the Judge to 
comment on the failure of an accused to take advantage or this 
right. In other words to encourage an accused to tell his story 
from the witness-box under proper safeguards.
There is, of course, another possibility which must be con­
sidered by those contemplating change. It is possible to abolish 
the privilege completely. This is what we have done in Ontario 
in matters falling within the Ontario Evidence Act. (8) The
7. (1940), 18 Can. Bar Rev. 808.
8. R.S.O. 1960 C. 125.
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Ontario Evidence Act s. 7 makes a person charged with violation 
of a provincial statute, competent and compellable and our 
courts have held that compellable means what it says, i.e., com­
pellable to give evidence which will incriminate him of the 
offence with which he is now charged. As Chancellor Boyd 
pointed out in R. v Fee (9) this privilege to remain silent has 
been ablish^d by a number of other statutes both British and 
Canadian. I think that it may fairly be said that up until the 
enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights there was litde, if any, 
dissatisfaction expressed by our strongly defence-minded Bar at 
the position of an accused person under the Ontario legislation. 
It may be that this was because the section was rarely availed of. 
At the moment, concern is being shown in respect of a similar 
compellability provision in the Ontario Securities Act.
British and American traditions are that the privilege 
against self-crimination is one of the great bulwarks of civil 
liberty.
Bentham wrote:
“If all the criminals of every class had assembled and 
framed a system after their own wishes, is not this rule 
the very first they would have established for their own 
security? Innocence never takes advantage of it — 
innocence claims the right of speaking, as guilt invokes 
the privilege of silence."
Sir Fitzjames Stephen wrote of the privilege:
“Its policy may well be discussed without laying open 
those who question it to the charge of disrespect for the 
law of England.1'
What of the other aspect of this privilege against self­
crimination? What Glanville Williams described as the right of 
any witness, other than the person on trial, to refuse to answer 
questions the answers to which might incriminate him? This 
privilege persists in the English common law and under the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. It 
has been abolished in Canada by both Dominion and Provincial 
Evidence Acts. For the old common law privilege has been 
substituted a statutory privilege — the witness must answer but 
his answer is not receivable against him in subsequent criminal 
proceedings. I am in favour of this most sensible modification 
of the common law rule. There is only one observation I would 
make. In Ontario, it is common for a witness to ask the Judge 
presiding at the trial at which the question is asked, for “the 
protection of the Canada Evidence Act.” Frequently the judge 
will accede to this request by saying that he “extends the pro­
tection.” It should be noted that a dialogue of this sort indi­
9. (1887), i3  O.R. 590.
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cates a misunderstanding of the statutory enactments. Suppose 
the question is put to a witness in a civil trial governed by the 
New Brunswick Evidence Act. Despite the fact that he objects 
to answer on the ground that the answer will tend to incriminate 
him, the judge will properly compel him to answer under sec­
tion 7 of the New Brunswick Act. Should that answer be 
offered against him in a subsequent trial for an offence against 
the Criminal Code, it is the judge at that second rial who will 
extend the protection of the Canada Evidence Act s. 5 (2) and 
exclude the answer. The witness deserves the protection by 
operation of law after he has been compelled to answer.
This discussion has been confined to the privilege not to 
incriminate yourself in court. Does the privilege exist outside 
the court-room? To quote from Professor Maguire again, it is 
clear that at common law this privilege accompanies a suspected 
person at all times and goes with him even into the police sta­
tion. With this aspect of the common law rule I am in complete 
agreement. A citizen is not bound to make incriminating state­
ments to the police nor is he, in general, required to furnish any 
other proof or his own guilt. I write “in general” not to hedge 
or equivocate, but to make allowance for such exceptions as the 
recent Saskatchewan legislation providing for the suspension 
of the driving licence of any licence holder who "when suspected 
of driving . . .  a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor . . . refused to comply with the request of a 
police officer . . . that he submit to the taking of a specimen of 
nis breath.” (10) The validity of this legislation came to be con­
sidered by the Supreme Court of Canada (11) and in his judg­
ment Rand J. (as he then was) demonstrated the type of testing 
which is necessary if the balance of individual liberty and social 
interest is to be kept in proper balance. Although, with respect, 
his remarks were not strictly relevant to the question before the 
Court [the existence of conflict between the Criminal Code 
s. 224 (4) and s. 92 (4) of the Motor Vehicle Act (Sask.) ), he 
weighs the dangers to the innocent who are required to give a 
sample against the dangers to society from the intoxicated driver 
and concludes "the public interest rises to a paramount im­
portance.”
I pass now to the second topic: the possibility that the law 
of evidence may be used as an indirect protection for civil 
liberties. What I mean by this is the possibility of the courts 
policing the police by rejecting evidence obtained by the police 
in violation of the civil liberties of a suspected or accused person.
10. Sask. Legis. Vehicles Act, 1957 (Sask.) c. 93 s. 92 (4).
11. [1958] S.C.R. 608.
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There are two sharply divergent views on the desirability 
of the courts engaging in this supervisory function.
Sir Patrick Devlin, in his book *The Criminal Prosecution 
in England” (12) is strongly in favour of such supervisory juris­
diction and includes as one of the sanctions available to the 
judge '‘the general power of excluding from the trial, whether 
it be legally admissible or not, evidence that is prejudical to 
the accused,’’ and he goes on to point out that the judge “will 
include in this category evidence that has been obtained by 
means he thinks unfair to accused persons generally.”
Professor F. E. Inbau of Northwestern University of Chi­
cago in the course of a paper delivered at the Criminal Law 
Conference held at the Osgoode Hall Law School in September, 
1960, took the opposite view. He maintained that:
“The courts have no right to police the police. That 
is an executive and not a judicial function.”
In his view, the courts have imposed a straight-jacket of anti­
quated, impractical rules and regulations while, at the same 
time, the public demand that the police satisfy the social re­
quirement of public protection. (13)
A good starting point for any discussion of these two diver­
gent points of view is the law relating to the admissibility of 
confessions. Sir Patrick takes the view that the rule that con­
fessions are to be excluded unless they are voluntary has nothing 
to do with policing the police but is confined to excluding un­
trustworthy evidence. Professor Inbau would not quarrel with 
Sir Patrick on the desirability of excluding untrustworthy evi­
dence. Battle is joined on the question of excluding evidence 
which although trustworthy has been obtained through some 
•violation, at the most, of the civil liberties of the accused as by 
torture or illegal detention; at the least through some violation 
of the sense of fair play in the community.
Inbau says:
“Of necessity criminal interrogators must deal with 
criminal offenders on a somewhat lower moral plane 
than that upon which ethical, law-abiding citizens are 
expected to conduct their everyday affairs”.
He makes it clear that he is opposed to any third degree 
tactics for he is “unalterably opposed to the use of any tactic 
. . . that is apt to make an innocent person confess.”
12. The Criminal Prosecution in England.
13. The proceedings are reported in the Criminal Law Quarterly, 
Vol. 3, No. 3 (1960).
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He does approve, however, “such psychological tactics and 
techniques as trickery and deceit that are not only helpful but 
frequently necessary in order to secure incriminating information 
from the guilty, or investigative leads from otherwise unco­
operative witnesses or informants.”
Devlin, on the other hand, maintains that the Judges’ Rules 
exist, not to exclude worthless evidence “but to regulate legiti­
mate methods of enquiry.” They are in his view “an expression 
of the judge’s discretionary power to exclude evidence unfairly 
or oppressively obtained.’ If a judge is satisfied that some 
unfair or oppressive use has been made of police power . . .  he 
will reject the evidence. It should be noted that Sir Patrick 
draws nis authorities for this discretion to reject evidence im­
properly obtained from somewhat tenuously related fields, that 
of the admissibility of similar fact evidence and the effect of im­
proper communication with a juror.
An examination of the cases actually on the point does not 
altogether support Sir Patrick’s conclusion.
It is true that, in Kumma v. R. (14) the Privy Council did say, 
obiter, that
“ . . .  in a criminal case the judge always has a discretion 
to disallow evidence if the strict rules of admissibility 
would operate unfairly against an accused . . .  If for in­
stance, some admission of some piece of evidence, e.g. a 
document, had been obtained from a defendant by a 
trick, no doubt the judge might properly rule it out . . . ”
However, in a later passage, their Lordships appear to have 
held that the question is
“whether what has been obtained is relevant to the issue 
being tried.”
Their Lordships were not talking about confessions but 
about real evidence which had been improperly obtained.
The attitude of Canadian courts to the admissibility of such 
real evidence is well exemplified by R. v. St. Lawrence (15) 
where McRuer C. J. H. C. held that
“it is permissible to prove . . . the facts discovered as a 
result of the inadmissible confession . . . ”
14. [1955] 1 All. E.R. 236 (P.C.) An example of the exercise of 
such discretion is to be found in R. v. McLean and McKinley 
(1960), 31 W.W.R. 89 (B.C.)
15. [1949] O.R. 215 followed in A.-G. lor Quebec, v. Begin [1955]
S.C.R. 593.
U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL 17
As Meredith J. A. once said (16)
“The criminal . . . has no right to insist upon being met 
by the law only when in kid gloves or satin slippers . . . ”
The opposite point of view has been well put on many occasions 
by the Supreme Court of the United States. In Rochin v. 
California (17), Mr. Justice Frankfurter had occasion to consider 
the admissibility of two capsules of morphine obtained by 
forcibly pumping the stomach of a person suspected of posses­
sion of morphine. In rejecting the evidence on constitutional 
grounds, the learned judge said
"  . . .  to sanction the brutal conduct . . . would be to 
afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be 
more calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize 
the temper of a society . . . ”
How is the balance to be adjusted? The police officer will 
answer that to reject evidence which is demonstrably true mere­
ly because it has been illegally obtained is to cut off your nose 
to spite your face. Those who take this view feel that society 
can use die ordinary methods of control under civil and criminal 
law to curb excessive zeal on the part of the police.
The other view is that public respect for the administration 
of justice requires that every step in the criminal process be 
beyond reproach and that me courts must keep their hands 
clean by rejecting any evidence, true or not, wnich has been 
improperly obtained.
In so far as the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled upon 
the matter it would appear that such evidence is admissible with 
the possible exception of the case where force was employed (18).
In Canadian law today, we buy our liberty at a very fair 
price.
16. R. v. Honan (1912), 26 O.L.R. 484 (Ont. C.A.).
17. (1951), 342 U.S. 165.
18. A.G. for Quebec, v. Begin [1955] S.C.R. 593.
